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ABSTRACT. This paper will cover a wide range of issues. It will start with a
reconstruction of the European Community’s ‘social deﬁcit’, arguing that a credible
response to this deﬁcit would be a pre-condition for the democratic legitimacy of the
deepened integration project. Such a response can be developed in a re-conceptu-
alisation of European law as a new type of supranational/trans-statal conﬂict of laws
– this is the thesis defended in the second section. This vision is contrasted in the
third section, ﬁrst with the steps towards Social Europe envisaged in the Draft
Constitutional Treaty, and then with the messages of the recent judgments of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Viking and Laval. It goes without saying that the
theoretical premises of the argument, let alone its many interdisciplinary dimensions
and empirical background, can often only be signalled, but not developed system-
atically.
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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY: A LEGACY OF UNRESOLVED
TENSIONS
The project of European integration was launched not as an experi-
ment in supranational democracy, but under the impression of the
Second World War and its devastating effects on the European
economies. It was meant to ensure lasting peace among former ene-
mies, and it had as its design an integration strategy which would
mitigate between the very different objectives and anxieties of
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Germany on the one hand, and the allied victors on the other.1 This
was accomplished through a primarily economic and technocratic
integration strategy. This was by no means a surprising choice. With
hindsight, however, the implications of this choice, which were hardly
foreseeable and certainly not a salient issue half a century ago, be-
come apparent. This is true for both the queries on which our analysis
will focus.
The ﬁrst may be called a ‘normative fact’, namely, the exclusion of
the ‘social’ sphere from the integrationist objectives which Fritz
Scharpf has famously characterised as the decoupling of the social
sphere from the economic sphere.2 But why should this decoupling be
problematical? The importance of this second query depends upon
two further assumptions. One concerns democratic theory: the
exclusion of the ‘social’ sphere from the integration project is a po-
tential failure of constitutional signiﬁcance only for those who as-
sume that the citizens of constitutional democracies are entitled to
vote in favour of welfare policies. This is by no means a trivial pre-
mise, not even at national level.3 The second premise concerns the
integration process. Only in the course of its deepening and growing
1 Students of European law tend to focus their analyses too much on the history
of ‘institutionalised Europe’ rather than on the diverse histories of the
Member States and their complex relations; J.H.H. Weiler’s dichotomy between
‘supranational law’ and ‘political intergovernmentalism’ reﬂects this perspective (see,
also, infra n. 14).
2 F.W. Scharpf, ‘‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of
Diversity’’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002), 645–670. It deserves to be
stressed that the founding fathers of ordo-liberalism to whom we owe the theory of
the economic constitution have insisted on the interdependence of both spheres (the
Interdependenz der Ordnungen; see, famously, W. Eucken, Grundzu¨ge der Wirts-
chaftspolitik (Tu¨bingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1952), 6th ed. 1990, 180 et seq.; out of the
rich literature on the interdependence theorem, see, for an extremely subtle recon-
struction, M. Wegmann, Fru¨her Neoliberalismus und europa¨ische Integration: Inter-
dependenz der nationalen, supranationalen und internationalen Ordnung von Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft (1932–1965) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), in particular at 369 et
seq.
3 Friedrich August von Hayek was the most outspoken critic of this thesis; the
turn to welfare policies means taking The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge,
1944). A legendary debate in the young German Federal Republic between Wolfgang
Abendroth and Ernst Forsthoﬀ concerned precisely that proble´matique (see A. Fi-
scher-Lescano and O. Eberl, ‘‘Der Kampf um ein soziales und demokratisches
Recht. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Wolfgang Abendroth’’ (2006) Bla¨tter fu¨r deutsche
und internationale Politik 51, 577–585) and these debates are going on until today (see
C. Harvey, ed. Special Issue on ‘‘Social Democracy’’, Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence on Social Democracy 17 (2004)).
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impact on the ‘economy and society’ will a response to the ‘social
deﬁcit’ become a political must.4
Europe’s Equilibrium in the Formative Period of the Integration
Process
Legal integration theory is an effort to provide a contextually (his-
torically, socially and politically) ‘adequate’ legal conceptualisation
of the state of the European Community (now Union). Two such
efforts to capture the ‘nature of the beast’ in its formative period
stand out and remain important:5 Germany’s ordo-liberalism and
Joseph Weiler’s theory of supranationalism.
Ordo-liberalism is an important theoretical tradition in Germany,
and a powerful contributor to German ideational politics. The ordo-
liberal school6 reconstructed the legal essence of the European project
as an ‘economic constitution’ which was not in need of anything like
democratic legitimacy. The freedoms guaranteed in the EEC Treaty,
the opening up of national economies, and anti-discrimination rules
and the commitment to a system of undistorted competition were
interpreted as a ‘decision’ that supported an economic constitution,
and which also matched the ordo-liberal conceptions of the frame-
work conditions for a market economic system. The fact that Europe
had started out on its integrationist path as a mere economic com-
munity lent plausibility to ordo-liberal arguments – and even required
them: in the ordo-liberal account, the Community acquired a legiti-
macy of its own by interpreting its pertinent provisions as prescribing
a law-based order committed to guaranteeing economic freedoms and
protecting competition by supranational institutions. This legitimacy
was independent of the state’s democratic constitutional institutions.
By the same token, it imposed limits upon the Community: thus,
4 For a brilliant recent analysis of this interdependence see J.P. McCormick,
Weber, Habermas, and Transformations of the European State. Constitutional, Social,
and Supranational Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2007).
5 Viking and Laval can even be read as a revival of ordo-liberal ideas; see the third
section in this paper, infra.
6 European integration was, in its early years, by no means an uncontested project
in the ordo-liberal school (see M. Wegmann, supra n. 3). Her analyses ﬁt well the
enquiry into the politics of competition policy by Y. Karagiannis, ‘‘Preference
Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Institutions: The Case of European Competition
Policy’’, unpublished doctoral thesis, EUI Florence (2007), ch. 7.
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discretionary economic policies seemed illegitimate and unlawful.7
The ordo-liberal European polity has a twofold structure: at supra-
national level, it is committed to economic rationality and a system
of undistorted competition, while, at national level, re-distributive
(social) policies may be pursued and developed further.
‘Integration through law’ is the legal paradigm commonly asso-
ciated with the formative era of the European Community outside the
German borders.8 It is not by chance that generations of scholars
have built upon it or tried to decipher its sociological basis.9 The
strength of the paradigm may well rest (in part!) on assumptions that
become apparent only when we look at social and economic policy
through its lens. Then we become aware of the Wahlverwandtschaft
with German ordo-liberalism in that only the European market-
building project was juridiﬁed through supranational law, whereas
social policy at European level could, at best, be said to have been
handled through intergovernmental bargaining processes.
Fritz Scharpf’s decoupling thesis is, at least on the surface, not
meant as a contribution to the debates on the constitutionalisation of
Europe. It does, however, build upon sociological assumptions with
constitutional implications, and this holds true, in particular, for the
argument that the social integration of capitalist societies requires
equilibrium between social and economic rationality. This is, of
course, again a primarily empirical issue, but it is one with obvious
implications for the legitimacy of the polity under scrutiny.10 Since
we can assume that ‘welfarism’ – notwithstanding its diverse modes –
is a common European heritage,11 it becomes imperative for the
integration project to address the ‘social’ sphere. Interestingly
enough, German ordo-liberalism used to be well aware of this
proble´matique – its early proponents conceptualised it as the
7 Signiﬁcant, here, is A. Mu¨ller-Armack, ‘‘Die Wirtschaftsordnung des Geme-
insamen Marktes’’, ibid., Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik (Freiburg:
Rombach, 1966), 401 et seq.
8 See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘‘The Community System: the Dual Character of Suprana-
tionalism’’, in Yearbook of European Law 1 (1981), 257–306.
9 Most recently, A. Vauchet, ‘‘A Europe of Norms. A Political Sociology of a
‘Community of Law’’’, 2007 (manuscript on ﬁle with author).
10 See the classical studies by J. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spa¨tkapi-
talismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973); Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen
Materialismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), and J.P. McCormick, supra n. 5,
176 et. seq.
11 See T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin,
2005) at 777 et seq.
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interdependence of societal and economic ‘orders’ (Ordnungen/
Verfassungen12).
To summarise: Europe was constituted as a dual polity. Its
‘economic constitution’ was non-political in the sense that it was not
subject to political interventions. This was its constitutional-supra-
national raison d’eˆtre. Social policy was treated as a categorically-
distinct subject. It belonged to the domain of political legislation,
and, as such, had to remain national. The social embeddedness of the
market could, and, indeed, should, be accomplished by the Member
States in diﬀerentiated ways – and, for a decade or so, the balance
seemed stable.13
The Completion of the Internal Market, the Erosion of the Economic
Constitution, and the Advent of Social Europe
The original equilibrium was not, however, to remain steady. One
important reason for its instability is the progress of the integration
project. This is not really paradoxical, not even surprising in the light
of the considerations in the previous section.
The Delors Commission’s 1985 White Paper on Completion of the
Internal Market14 is widely perceived as a turning point and a
breakthrough in the integration process. Jacques Delors’ initiative
promised to overcome a long phase of stagnation; the means to this
end was the strengthening of Europe’s competitiveness. Economic
rationality, rather than ‘law’, was – from that point on – to be
understood as Europe’s orienting maxim, its ﬁrst commitment and its
12 Verfassung in German has a double meaning. It can be a legal constitution and
a social structure or pattern. The notion of Ordnung (order), too, comprises this
twofold meaning. This clariﬁcation is necessary to convey our idea of a constitu-
tionalisation of the economy, of other societal spheres or parts of the legal system.
Such constitutionalisation can either claim the dignity of constitutional law (e.g.,
supremacy within the legal system) or be an integral part of the constitutional order.
In this latter sense, Ju¨rgen Habermas talks of the co-originality of private and public
law; see his Faktizita¨t und Geltung (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1992), 112 et seq.
13 This all ﬁts well into the analysis of ‘‘the national conﬁguration of the state in
the Golden Age’’, by St. Leibfried and M. Zu¨rn, ‘‘Reconﬁguring the National
Constellation’’, in St. Leibfried and Michael Zu¨rn, eds, Transformation of the State
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 93–117. It also seems worth noting that the
ordo-liberal construct has structural aﬃnities, or is at least compatible, with J.H.H.
Weiler’s analysis of the co-existence of and interdependence between legal supra-
nationalism and political intergovernmentalism in the EEC (see supra n. 8).
14 EC Commission, ‘‘Commission White Paper to the European Council on
Completion of the Internal Market’’, COM (85) 310 ﬁnal of 14 June 1985.
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regulative idea. In this sense, it seems justiﬁed to characterise Delors’
programme as a deliberate move towards an institutionalisation of
economic rationality. This seems even more plausible when we con-
sider the two complementary institutional innovations accomplished
through, and subsequent to, the Maastricht Treaty, namely, Mone-
tary Union and the Stability Pact. Europe looked like a market-
embedded polity governed by an economic constitution, rather than
by political rule.
This characterisation, however, soon proved to be too simplistic
by far.15 What had started out as an eﬀort to strengthen Europe’s
competitiveness and to accomplish this objective through new (de-
regulatory) strategies, soon led to the entanglement of the EU in ever
more policy ﬁelds and the development of sophisticated regulatory
machinery. It was, in particular, the concern of European legislation
and the Commission with ‘social regulation’ (the health and safety of
consumers and workers, and environmental protection) that served as
irrefutable proof of this. The weight and dynamics of these policy
ﬁelds had been thoroughly underestimated by the proponents of the
‘economic constitution’. Equally important and equally unsurprising
was the fact that the integration process deepened with the comple-
tion of the Internal Market and aﬀected ever more policy ﬁelds. This
was signiﬁcant not so much in terms of its factual weight but, in view
of Europe’s ‘social deﬁcit’, in terms of the new eﬀorts to strengthen
Europe’s presence in the spheres of labour and social policy.
These tendencies entered the mainstream during the preparation of
the Maastricht Treaty, which was adopted in 1992. This is why this
Amendment of the Treaty, ofﬁcially presented as both a deepening and
a consolidation of the integration project, met with ﬁerce criticism. The
most outspoken critique came not from the political left, but from the
proponents of the new economic philosophy and, in particular, from
Germany’s ordo-liberals.16 Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 can
be read as a break with the ordo-liberal economic constitution. After
the explicit recognition and strengthening of new policy competences,
which was accomplished in Maastricht, it seemed simply no longer
plausible to assign a constitutive function to the ‘system of undistorted
competition’ because this very ‘system’ had been downgraded to being
15 For more details see C. Joerges, ‘‘Economic Law, the Nation-State and the
Maastricht Treaty’’, in R. Dehousse, ed., Europe after Maastricht: an Ever Closer
Union? (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994), 29–62.
16 See M. Streit and W. Mussler, ‘‘The Economic Constitution of the European
Community. From ‘Rome’ to ‘Maastricht’’’, European Law Journal 1 (1995), 5–30.
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one among many others. In addition, the expansion of competences
in labour law by the Social Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy
of the Treaty blurred the formerly clear lines between Europe’s
(apolitical) economic constitution and the political responsibility that
Member States had for social and labour policies.
Until today, a consensus on the interpretation of this new constel-
lation did not emerge. Was this a result of contingent events and
decisions? Was there a deeper ‘logic’ at work? Back in 1944, Karl
Polanyi, in his seminalGreat Transformation, had argued that markets
will always be ‘socially embedded’.17 He had not spelled out the
political and normative implications of his sociological observations,
but the European experience seems, in principle, reconcilable with his
messages. Once it became apparent that markets could not be under-
stood simply as being mechanisms that functioned perfectly and
automatically to adjust supply and demand, the ‘critical question’ was:
[n]o longer the quantitative issue of how much state or how much market, but rather
the qualitative issue of how and for what ends should markets and states be com-
bined and what are the structures and practices in civil society that will sustain a
productive synergy of states and markets.18
It is far beyond my competence to evaluate, let alone to sub-
stantiate, such suggestions. All I wish to submit is that the ‘social
embeddedness’ thesis can help us to understand why Europe has
developed an ever more sophisticated regulatory machinery entrusted
with the management of the internal market – and why the social
deﬁcit of the European construction has become a prominent part of
the European agenda.
CONFLICT OF LAWS AS CONSTITUTIONAL FORM
To rephrase the concluding remark of the previous section: lawyers
are ill-equipped to decipher the historical, political and sociological
determinants of the developments of law. Their vocation may
17 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time (1944) (Boston: Bacon Press, 1992), at 45–58, and 71–80.
18 See F. Block, ‘‘Towards a New Understanding of Economic Modernity’’, in C.
Joerges, B. Stra˚th and P. Wagner, eds, The Economy as a Polity. The Political
Construction of Modern Capitalism – An Interdisciplinary Perspective (London: UCL
Press, 2005), 3; and most recently J. Beckert, ‘‘The Great Transformation of Em-
beddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology’’, MPIfG Discussion
Paper 07/1.
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however, be to offer legal conceptualisations which are compatible
with what we know about the law’s context – and, at the same time,
seek to explain whether, or under what conditions, a deliberate
adaptation to these contexts would ‘deserve recognition’.
This is by no means a revolutionary suggestion, but is rather a
continuous challenge for legal scholarship, in particular for students
of European law who are confronted with a moving target and thus
have to conceptualise a ‘Wandelverfassung’.19 The idea of a new type
of conﬂict of laws as Europe’s proper constitutional form, for which
this section will argue, should be read in this light. Our suggestion is
less idiosyncratic in substance than the terminology it uses may ap-
pear to propose; indeed, the core argument upon which it rests is in
fact quite simple. Back in 1997, Ju¨rgen Neyer and I submitted it
under the heading of ‘deliberative’ (as opposed to ‘orthodox’)
supranationalism:20
The legitimacy of governance within constitutional states is ﬂawed in so far as it
remains inevitably one-sided and parochial or selﬁsh. The taming of the nation-state
through democratic constitutions has its limits. [If and, indeed, because] democracies
pre-suppose and represent collective identities, they have very few mechanisms
[through which] to ensure that ‘foreign’ identities and their interests are taken into
account within their decision-making processes.21
If the legitimacy of supranational institutions can be designed to
cure these deﬁciencies – as a correction of ‘nation-state failures’, as it
were – they may then derive their legitimacy from this compensatory
function. To quote a recent restatement:
We must conceptualise supranational constitutionalism as an alternative to the
model of the constitutional nation-state which respects that state’s constitutional
legitimacy, but, at the same time, clariﬁes and sanctions the commitments arising
from its interdependence with equally democratically legitimised states and with
the supranational prerogatives that an institutionalisation of this interdependence
requires.22
19 H.P. Ipsen, ‘‘Die Verfassungsrolle des Europa¨ischen Gerichtshofs fu¨r die
Integration’’, in J. Schwarze, ed., Der Europa¨ische Gerichtshof als Verfassungsgericht
und Rechtsschutzinstanz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1982), 29 et seq.
20 C. Joerges and J. Neyer, ‘‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative
Political Processes’’, European Law Journal 3 (1997), 273–299.
21 Ibid., at 293.
22 C. Joerges ‘‘‘Deliberative Political Processes’ Revisited: What have we learnt
about the Legitimacy of Supranational Decision-Making’’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 44 (2006), 779–802, at 790.
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This, of course, is not the way in which the supranational validity
of European law was originally understood and justiﬁed. Fortunately
enough, however, the methodologically and theoretically bold and
practically successful ECJ decision in favour of a European legal
constitution23 can be rationalised in this way. The European ‘feder-
ation’ thus found a legal constitution that did not have to aim at
Europe’s becoming a state, but was able to derive its legitimacy from
the fact that it compensates for the democratic deﬁcits of the nation
states. This is precisely the point of deliberative supranationalism.
Existing European law had, we argued, validated principles and rules
that meet with and deserve supranational recognition because they
constitute a palpable community project: Community members
cannot implement their interests or laws without restraint, but are
obliged to respect the European freedoms; they are not allowed to
discriminate and can pursue only legitimate regulatory policies which
have been blessed by the Community; they must, in relation to the
objectives that they wish to pursue through regulation, harmonise
with each other, and they must shape their national systems in the
most community-friendly way possible.
Why should this type of law be called a new type of conﬂict of
laws? This notion reminds us of Europe’s internal diversity, that it
represents the effort to live with diversity rather than to strive for
uniformity, the fact that diversity is a cause of conﬂict of interests
both, horizontally, among Member States and societal actors and,
vertically, between the different levels of governance and the insti-
tutional actors representing them.24 On the other hand, conﬂict of
laws has traditionally – in all its sub-disciplines: private international
law, international administrative law, international labour law, etc., –
refused to apply foreign ‘public’ law; each state determined the
international scope of its own public law unilaterally. Traditional
conﬂict of laws is, therefore, a paradigm example of what Michael
Zu¨rn characterises as ‘methodological nationalism’.25 The ‘new’
European conﬂict of laws has, of course, to overcome this hostility,
and the principles just cited do exactly that: they guide the search for
responses to conﬂicting claims where no higher substantive law is
23 Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1 – Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen.
24 R. Mayntz, ‘‘The Architecture of Multi-level Governance of Economic Sec-
tors’’, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/13, at 22–24.
25 M. Zu¨rn, ‘‘The State in the Post-National Constellation – Societal Denation-
alisation and Multi-Level Governance’’, Oslo: ARENAWorking Paper No. 35/1999.
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readily available. To give voice to foreign’ concerns means, in the EU,
ﬁrst of all, that Member States mutually ‘recognise’ their laws (that
they are prepared to ‘apply’ foreign law), that they tolerate legal
diﬀerences and refrain from insisting on their own lex fori and
domestic interests. This European law of conﬂict of laws is ‘deliber-
ative’ in that it does not content itself with appealing to the
supremacy of European law; it is ‘European’ because it seeks to
identify principles and rules that make diﬀerent laws within the EU
compatible with one another.26 The conﬂict of laws approach
envisages a horizontal constitutionalism for the EU. It distances itself
from both the orthodoxy of conﬂict of laws and from orthodox
supranationalism, which promotes top-down solutions to Europe’s
diversity. It seeks to accomplish what the Draft Constitutional Treaty
had called the ‘motto of the Union’,27 namely, the vision of ‘unity in
diversity’. Is this a new perspective for solving Europe’s social deﬁcit?
SOFT AND HARD RESPONSES TO THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL EUROPE
In a recent essay dealing with state of the European Union after the
signing of the Reform Treaty, Ju¨rgen Habermas took issue with the
tendency of Germany’s Social Democrats to respond to the risks of
economic globalisation by using the means of the national welfare
state. Would it not be preferable, he asked, to search for co-ordinated
responses within the whole European economic space?28 His question
26 I refrain here from explaining two further implications in depth, but I shall
mention them. One is methodological: European conﬂict of laws requires a proce-
duralisation of the category of law, which has to be understood as a ‘law of law-
making’ (see F.I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, New Jersey: Princeton UP,
1999, 34), a Rechtfertigungs-Recht (R. Wietho¨lter, ‘‘Just-iﬁcations of a Law of
Society’’, in O. Perez and G. Teubner, eds, Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law
(Oxford: Hart, 2005), 65–77). The second concerns the need for a ‘second order of
conﬂict of laws’. This need stems from the ‘turn to governance’ that we witness not
just at the European level but also with nation states. Just as nation states have long
had to learn to deal with complex conﬂict situations, to integrate expertise in legal
decision-making and to co-operate with non-governmental actors, the EU had to
build up governance arrangements which complement its primary and secondary
law. ‘Second order conﬂict of laws’ seeks to constitutionalise this sphere, primarily
through a proceduralisation of law; for more detail, see C. Joerges, ‘‘Integration
through De-legalisation?’’, European Law Review 33 (2008), 291–312.
27 Article I–8 of the Draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe, OJ C310/1, 16/12/
2004.
28 ‘‘Erste Hilfe fu¨r Europa’’, DIE ZEIT no.49/2007.
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implicitly acknowledges the importance of Europe’s social deﬁcit, but
which answers are available? We are currently witnessing two seem-
ingly contradictory, albeit complementary responses, namely, the
resort to soft modes of governance on the one hand, and the return to
orthodox supranationalism on the other.
Social Rights and Soft Co-ordination
The ﬁrst-named alternative was the option pursued by the Draft
Constitutional Treaty29 and a great number of its supporters. ‘Social
Europe’ was to rest, in particular, on three corner stones: the com-
mitment to a ‘competitive social market economy’,30 the recognition
of ‘social rights’,31 and ‘soft law’ techniques for the co-ordination of
social policies.32 Joschka Fischer and Domenique de Villepin, to
whom we owe the assignment of constitutional dignity to the concept
of the ‘social market economy’, were giving a political signal, but they
were hardly aware of the interdependence of the economic and the
social constitution in the theory of the ‘soziale Marktwirtschaft’. This
legacy would have required what was not yet an imperative in the
formative era of the European Economic Community, namely, a
compensation for the decoupling of both spheres in the European
Treaty.33 The new social rights and the new co-ordination compe-
tences thus had to carry the hopes of being a cure,34 but this hope was
never founded on solid ground.35 Undoubtedly, the social rights
agenda will survive both the Draft Constitutional Treaty and the
Lisbon Treaty in some form, as will the Open Method of Co-ordi-
nation; however, in the present context, we cannot and indeed need
not examine the intrinsic merits and failures of these speciﬁc options,
29 The Lisbon Treaty as signed on 13 December 2007 does not advance this
agenda.
30 Article 3 (3), DCT.
31 See Title IV DCT.
32 See, especially, Article I-14 (4) DCT on the assignment of a competence ‘to
promote and co-ordinate the economic and employment policies of the Member
States’ has been repealed. Article I-11(3) as amended on 22 June 2004.
33 See, in more detail, C. Joerges and F. Ro¨dl, ‘‘The ‘‘Social Market Economy’’ as
Europe’s Social Model?’’, in L. Magnusson and B. Stra˚th, eds, A European Social
Citizenship? Pre-conditions for Future Policies in Historical Light (Brussels: Lang,
2005) 125–158.
34 See the contributions to G. de Bu´rca and B. de Witte, eds, Social Rights in
Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2005) and G. de Bu´rca and J. Scott, eds, Law and New
Governance in the EU and the US (Oxford: Hart, 2006).
35 See C. Joerges and F. Ro¨dl, supra n. 33.
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because the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has served to re-conﬁgure
the agenda. After Viking and Laval, one will have to ask what the
objective of soft methods of co-ordination can be in the confronta-
tion with the hard law of negative integration.
The ECJ Judgments in Viking and Laval
The two cases have attracted wide attention over the last years. The
conﬂicts that they deal with are directly related to the new socio-eco-
nomic diversity in theUnion subsequent to its Eastern Enlargement. In
both cases, ‘old’ (high wage) Member States defend the principle that
their wage level must not be eroded by low wage offers from the new
Member States, and invoke the economic freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaty that they had made strategic use of in the past, namely in order
to operate at home at the wage levels of their eastern neighbours. ‘It is a
bracing reminder to EU lawyers of the power of political and economic
context to inﬂuence legal doctrine’, observes Brian Bercusson,36 ‘that
the new Member States making submissions were unanimous on one
side of the arguments on issues of fundamental legal doctrine (hori-
zontal direct eﬀect, discrimination, proportionality) and the old
Member States virtually unanimous on the other’.
Viking
The plaintiffs in the Viking case37 were a Finnish shipping company
(Viking) and their Estonian subsidiary. Viking was a large ferry
operator, one of which was the ferry Rosella, which was registered in
Finland and had a predominantly Finnish crew. A collective agree-
ment negotiated by the Finnish Seamen’s Union provided that the
wages and conditions of employment were to be at the Finnish level.
The Rosella was running at a loss and Viking decided to re-ﬂag the
ferry in Estonia, with the Finnish crew to be replaced by less costly
Estonian seamen. Both the Finnish and the Estonian Union were
aﬃliates to an international federation, the International Transport
Workers’ Federation (ITF), whose prime policy targets included that
of ‘ﬂags of convenience’. It is the ITF’s objective to achieve collective
36 ‘‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day’’,
European Law Journal 13 (2007), 279–308.
37 Case C-438/05, Viking Line Abp OU Viking Line Eesti v The International
Transport Workers’ Federation, The Finnish Seamen’s Union. For a detailed analysis,
see B. Bercusson ‘‘‘Six Scenarios in Search of an Author…’ Or Solutions for the
European Court in the Cases of Laval and Viking’’ (Typescript, London, 2007), on
ﬁle with author.
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agreements under the law of the place where the beneﬁcial ownership
and control of the vessel lie, and to defend in this way seafarers
against low wage strategies of employers such as Viking, who seek to
replace their seafarers with a workforce from low-wage countries.
Following this policy, ITF urged its member unions not to enter into
negotiations regarding a new agreement with Viking. As the ECJ
noted,38 such a policy would, if eﬀective, render re-ﬂagging pointless,
and this was the reason why Viking brought an action ﬁrst in Helsinki
and then before the Court of Justice of England and Wales, arguing
inter alia that the threatened collective action was incompatible with
Viking’s freedom of establishment as guaranteed by Article 43.
Two of the ECJ’s pronouncements are of particular interest here.
The ﬁrst is that Article 43 ‘applies’ to collective action initiated in
order to induce an undertaking to enter into a collective agreement.
This ‘application’ of Article 43 is, however, tempered by the right to
strike, which ‘must be recognised as a fundamental right which forms
an integral part of the general principles of Community law’,39 and
‘[i]n that regard, the Court has already held that the protection of
fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justiﬁes
a restriction of the obligations’ to respect the economic freedoms.40
The Court appears just to be making a small move here, the eﬀect of
which is simply to bring the framework which Community law has
developed in the assessment of the legitimacy of restrictions imposed
by national law to bear. However, in the Viking case, this move
concerned an area of the law in which the Community has very
limited competences, as Article 137(5) explicitly provides. Can the
recognition of the right to strike imply the competence to interfere
with the social functions assigned to this right within the national
legal systems and their ‘Arbeits- und Sozialverfassungen’? This is what
the Court implicitly seems to suggest in the next paragraph, where it
states that the exercise of fundamental rights ‘must be reconciled with
requirements related to rights protected under the Treaty and in
accordance with the principle of proportionality’.41
This coupling of the European economic freedoms with national
labour law is completed by the second step that the Court takes when
it equates the obstacles to the freedom of movement created by state
barriers with ‘obstacles resulting from the exercise, by associations or
38 Case C-438/05, para.18.
39 Ibid., para. 44.
40 Ibid., para. 45.
41 Ibid., para. 46.
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organisations not governed by public law, of their legal autonomy’.42
Indeed, the Court then goes on to underline that ‘the activities of the
Community are to include ‘‘a policy in the social sphere’’’.43 This
‘social purpose’ would legitimate collective action aimed at ‘pro-
tecting the jobs and conditions of employment’, provided they re-
sponded to a ‘serious threat’ to the union members and ‘do not go
beyond what is necessary to attain that objective’.44
The Court leaves this evaluation to the national court. The guid-
ance it provides remains limited – and somewhat indeterminate.
Action against the registering of a vessel in another Member State
‘cannot be objectively justiﬁed’; nevertheless, a protective policy re-
mains justiﬁable. However, solidarity action undertaken regardless of
the degree of protection available in the state of reﬂagging is going
too far.45 In Viking, the Court took bold steps toward the estab-
lishment of a Community framework for the supervision of industrial
action, but then showed judicial self-restraint when it came to the
exercise of that supervision. In Laval, such prudence is no longer
visible.
Laval
The plaintiff in the Laval case46 was a company incorporated under
Latvian law, whose registered oﬃce was in Riga. Laval’s Swedish
subsidiary (Bygg AB) had won the tender for a school building on the
outskirts of Stockholm and, in obtaining the tender, Bygg AB had
proﬁted from its ability to post workers from Latvia to Sweden, and
the considerably lower wage level in Latvia. InMay 2004, Laval posted
several dozen of its workers to work on the Swedish building sites.
Sweden had implemented the 1996 posted workers’ directive47 in
1999, but its implementing legislation did not introduce a system for
42 Ibid., para. 57. Space constraints here do not permit a discussion of the case law
the Court invokes, so it must suﬃce to recall the sensitivity with which Community
law and policy proceeded in the cases of obstacles to free movement created by
‘private’ standardisation. See H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance.
Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 37
et seq.
43 Case C-438/05, para. 78.
44 Ibid., para. 81, 84.
45 Ibid., para. 88, 89.
46 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet,
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, Avdelning 1, Svenska Elektrikerforbundet.
47 Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services. OJ 1996, L18/1.
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declaring collective agreements universally applicable as foreseen in
Article 3(8) of the Directive.48 Swedish law does not require foreign
undertakings to apply the pertinent local collective agreements.
However, trade unions are entitled to take action in order to
attain the imposition of the higher Swedish wages. The Swedish
building and public works trade union and also, in support, the
electricians’ trade union, did this with such determination and
intensity, in particular through the picketing of building sites, that
Laval gave up.
The ﬁrst question that the Court was required to answer con-
cerned both European primary law, namely, the freedom to provide
services (Article 49) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article
12), and secondary law, namely, the posted workers’ directive just
cited. The Directive does not harmonise the substantive provisions on
the employment of posted workers: rather, it subjects this relation-
ship in principle to the law of the host state (Article 50). As indicated,
in its transposition of Directive 96/71, Sweden neither provided for
minimum wages (which would have been compatible with Article 3(1)
of the Directive, nor declared pertinent collective agreements to be
universally applicable (as foreseen in Article 3(8)). Had anybody in
Sweden or elsewhere in the negotiation process realised that this
subsection of the Directive would require an amendment of the
Swedish Constitution? Could the ECJ have placed more emphasis on
the fact that, as pointed out by G.A. Mengozzi,49 Directive 96/71 did
not aim to harmonise ‘either the substantive rules of the Member
States as regards employment law and the terms and conditions of
employment relating, in particular, to rates of pay, or the right to
resort to collective action’? Should the incompatibility between the
modes foreseen in Directive 96/71 and the Swedish constitutional
system be judged in the light of Article 137(5) EC, which expressly
reserves to the powers of the Member States the regulation of ‘pay,
the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-
outs’? The Court ruled otherwise: Swedish law must not empower
unions to insist on collective agreements,
48 This Article provides in its ﬁrst sub-section: ‘Collective agreements or arbi-
tration awards which have been declared universally applicable’ means collective
agreements or arbitration awards which must be observed by all undertakings in the
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned; see Case C-341/05,
paras. 65, 84.
49 See para. 58 of his opinion in Case C-341/05.
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certain terms of which depart from [European] legislative provisions and establish
more favourable terms and conditions of employment as regards the matters referred
to in Article 3(1), ﬁrst sub-paragraph, (a) to (g) of Directive 96/71 and others relate
to matters not referred to in that provision.50
Hidden in this statement is a strong supremacy claim: Directive
96/71 is certainly an important piece of European labour law. It is
not, however, an element of some comprehensive system of labour
and social law, whereas the Swedish guarantee of the right to take
collective action in its Constitution needs to be understood as an
integral part of the Swedish social model.51 Is the EC entitled to insist
that Sweden re-deﬁne the role of the trade unions and the compe-
tences of the state which form part of the Swedish Constitution be-
cause of one sub-section of a European directive?
We will return to this conﬂict-of-laws’ issue. In the present case, it
is only of practical importance in the context of Article 49, as alluded
to in the ﬁrst part of the passage cited: does European law affect the
right to industrial action as Sweden grants it to trade unions? As in
Viking, the ECJ underlined that ‘the right to take collective action
must… be recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral
part of the general principles of Community law’ and that their
protection by a Member State is understood as a ‘legitimate interest’
in Community law.52 This conﬁrmation, however, is followed by a
move which fundamentally reconﬁgures the balance between eco-
nomic freedoms and social rights at national level:
It should be noted that…Article 49 EC became directly applicable in the legal orders
of the Member States on expiry of the transitional period and confers on individuals’
rights which are enforceable by them and which the national courts must protect.53
Somewhat ironically, the disempowerment of Swedish trade un-
ions which this insertion of a new fundamental (economic) right into
the Swedish constitutional order implies is also presented as reﬂecting
a European achievement in the cure of its social deﬁcit:
…[T]he Community has…not only an economic but also a social purpose, the rights
under the provisions of the EC Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy,
which include, as is clear from the ﬁrst paragraph of Article 136 EC, inter alia,
50 Ibid., 99.
51 See Case C-341/05, paras. 10, 92.
52 Case C-341/05, paras. 91, 93 & 103.
53 Ibid., para. 97.
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improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation
while improvement is being maintained, proper social protection and dialogue be-
tween management and labour.54
This amounts to nothing less than a re-writing of the Swedish
social model, not in the name of European economic constitution –
such a move would be difﬁcult to understand in the light of the
degrading of ‘the system of undistorted competition’ from an
objective to a mere instrument by the Lisbon Treaty – but in the
name of an incomplete European social constitution and the reser-
vation of Member State competences by Article 137(5).55
True Conﬂicts and the Judicial Function
The references to conﬂict of law in the second section (see above) did
not mention a query with traditional conﬂict of laws, which was
raised by the American conﬂict-of-laws scholar Brainerd Currie back
in the 1960s. This query concerned the judicial function in interstate
constellations:
[C]hoice between the competing interests of co-ordinate states is a political function
of a high order, which ought not, in a democracy, to be committed to the judi-
ciary: …the court is not equipped to perform such a function; and the Constitution
speciﬁcally confers that function upon Congress.56
Currie was writing for the federal system of the US, and thus there
are important differences to consider before one brings his query to
the EU.57 One diﬀerence, or European peculiarity, was underlined at
the beginning, namely, the decoupling of the social from the
economic constitution and the diﬃculties militating against the
54 Ibid., para. 105.
55 The second question the Court was asked concerned the importance of col-
lective agreements signed by Laval in Latvia. The Court here was not considering
that such agreement should be recognised as equivalent to those of Sweden – such a
suggestion would be plainly incompatible with the posted workers’ directive. Instead,
it held that it was discriminatory to treat Laval as an undertaken which had not
concluded any collective agreement (para. 116).
56 B. Currie, ‘‘The Constitution and the Choice of Governmental Law: Interests
and the Judicial Function’’, (1958), in Selected Essays (Durham NC: Duke UP,
1963), 188–282, at 272.
57 F. Ro¨dl, ‘‘Weltbu¨rgerliches Kollisionsrecht’’ Ph.D. Thesis EUI 2008, Part 2, A
II.2, suggests that Currie’s objection against a weighing of governmental interests in
cases of true conﬂicts is to be understood in the light of the presence of a consti-
tutional court in the American federal system. My own evaluation of the diﬀerent
constitutional constellations goes in the opposite direction.
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establishment of a single European Sozialstaat. The ECJ’s argument
implies that European economic freedoms, tamed only by an
unspeciﬁed ‘social dimension’ of the Union, trump the Arbeits- and
Sozialverfassung of a Member State, even though the Treaty expressly
restricts Community competences in this ﬁeld. In view of the obsta-
cles to the establishment of a comprehensive European welfare state,
the respect of the common European legacy of Sozialstaatlichkeit
seems to require the acceptance of European diversity and an exercise
of judicial self-restraint where European economic freedoms come
into conﬂict with national welfare traditions. The ECJ, however, is
not a constitutional court with comprehensive competences – it is not
legitimated to re-organise the interdependence of Europe’s social and
economic constitutions, let alone to replace the variety of European
social models with a uniform Hayekian Rechtsstaat. It should
therefore refrain from ‘weighing’ the values of Sozialstaatlichkeit
against the value of free market access and stick to its ‘proper’
function, which, we have argued, is to develop supranational law
which compensates for the ‘democracy failures’ of nation states.
National welfare traditions do not – by deﬁnition – represent such
failures, and their defence does not require a suspension of the
accomplishments of democratic constitutionalism. What was at issue
in Viking was the post-national strategy of the trade unions, who
sought to respond to the social consequences of reﬂagging, while in
Laval what was at issue was not the soundness of the posted workers’
directive, but the strategic use of wage diﬀerences within the EU.
What the trade unions employed was a means to counter the increase
in power accrued by the employer due to the European economic
freedoms; to argue that the right to collective action to national
constellations that is subject to a European freedom is not only to
conﬁrm the de facto decoupling of the social from the economic
constitution, but also to subject the former de jure to the latter.
A deﬁnite evaluation of the impact of Viking and Laval is not yet
possible but it is suﬃciently clear, however, that this jurisprudence is
a hard law step of negative integration. What about the chances for a
correction of this step by the soft means of the Open Method of
Co-ordination? Here it seems telling that in both of these cases the
move against old labour law was initiated in high wage countries. Is it
in the long-term interest of the new Member States to dismantle the
welfarism of their western and northern European neighbours? What
would that mean for their long-term competitive advantages and
their chances for similar developments?
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